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CENSORS IN CYBERSPACE: CAN CONGRESS PROTECT 
CHILDREN FROM INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY DESPITE 
ASHCROFT v. ACLU? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is a forum unlike any other.  Whether you want to view Tupac 
Shakur’s autopsy photos, relive Janet Jackson’s 2004 “wardrobe malfunction” 
or chat with fellow church goers, you can do it all online.  This “marketplace 
of ideas”1 for the twenty-first century enables people to communicate, for no 
cost, with others throughout the world.  And, young or old, the world is 
logging on.  As of 2004, approximately sixty-two percent of all Americans 
regularly used the Internet.2  Today, 6.4 billion Internet users around the 
world3 can access any of the innumerable Web sites available online or send 
messages of their own. 
But where there is free speech, there is controversy.  Some twelve percent 
of all Web sites contain pornographic material4 that varies “from the modestly 
titillating to the hardest-core.”5  These sites are easily accessible to children 
under eighteen; in fact, children ages twelve to seventeen represent the largest 
group of pornography consumers.6  Studies show that the average child first 
views pornographic material on the Internet at age eleven, and that 
approximately eighty percent of all children have viewed numerous hard-core 
pornography Web sites by the age of seventeen.7 
 
 1. The phrase “marketplace of ideas” is a metaphor for the idea that “the source of the 
message is the seller.  She or he is allowed to express ideas to anyone who is wiling to listen.  The 
receiver of the message is like the buyer, and may freely decide to agree or disagree with the 
message.”  DOUGLAS M. FRALEIGH & JOSEPH S. TRUMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: IN THE 
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 13 (1997).  This idea has formed the basis for judicial opinions limiting 
government control over speech.  Id. at 13–14. 
 2. PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, INTERNET: THE MAINSTREAMING OF 
ONLINE LIFE 59 (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/Internet_Status_2005.pdf. 
 3. Internet World Stats, Internet Usage Statistics–The Big Picture, 
http://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2005). 
 4. Internet Filter Review, Internet Pornography Statistics, http://internet-filter-
review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2005). 
 5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 
844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
 6. Internet Filter Review, supra note 4. 
 7. Id. 
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Minors’ increasing access to Internet pornography has not escaped 
congressional attention.  In 1996, Congress passed the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA),8 which forbade the transmission of indecent or patently 
offensive materials to minors over the Internet.9  Web site providers and free 
speech advocates immediately challenged the CDA in American Civil Liberties 
Union v. Reno.10  Reno eventually reached the Supreme Court, where the 
majority wrote that the CDA’s overbreadth and vagueness rendered it 
unconstitutional.11  However, the Court’s decision in Reno went beyond 
merely finding a First Amendment violation.  The Court, comparing the CDA 
to similar statutes that had passed constitutional muster, implied that Congress 
could transform the CDA into legislation that would pass First Amendment 
scrutiny.12  The Court seemed to assure Congress that it could regulate the 
Internet. 
Armed with the Court’s suggestions from Reno, Congress immediately 
began considering proposals for new Internet legislation.13  Congress remedied 
many of the problems the Court found with the CDA, and in 1998 created the 
Child Online Protection Act (COPA).14  Several plaintiffs immediately 
challenged COPA as violating the First Amendment rights of Internet 
speakers.15  COPA trudged through the courts, and reached the Supreme Court 
for a second time in 2004.16  On July 29, 2004, in a five-to-four decision, the 
 
 8. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).  President Clinton signed the CDA into law on Feb. 8, 1996.  
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 826–27.  The CDA composes Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.  Id. 
 9. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d).  Some blame the Time magazine article “On a Screen Near You: 
Cyberporn” of enraging the public and fueling Congress to enact the CDA.  Yaman Akdeniz, 
Governing Pornography & Child Pornography on the Internet: The UK Approach, 32 UWLA L. 
REV. 247, 247 n.2 (2001); Norman Solomon, How Time Magazine Promoted a Cyberhoax, 
ALTERNET, Apr. 26, 2000, http://www.alternet.org/columnists/story/8744/.  The Time article 
declared that 83.5% of images stored on Usenet groups were pornographic and reported that 
viewing pornographic material is one of the largest recreational computer uses.  Philip Elmer-
Dewitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38.  Three weeks later Time 
retracted the article, stating that the study it was based on “grossly exaggerated the extent of 
pornography on the Internet” and included statistics that were “misleading or meaningless.”  
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Fire Storm on the Computer Nets, TIME, July 24, 1995, at 57. 
 10. 929 F. Supp. at 827 & n.2. 
 11. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874, 882, 884 (1997). 
 12. Id. at 864–86. 
 13. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476–77 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating that Congress 
tried to remedy the CDA with new legislation). 
 14. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as 47 
U.S.C. § 231 (2000)).  COPA has been dubbed “the son of the CDA” due to the similarities 
between the two statutes.  See, e.g., Golden Gate University Library, The Sons of the CDA: 
Filtering the Internet by Law, http://internet.ggu.edu/university_library/if/son_of_cda.html (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2005). 
 15. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476. 
 16. Ashcroft v. ACLU 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
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Court found that COPA violated the First Amendment despite Congress’s 
compliance with the Court’s suggestions in Reno.17  Again, however, the Court 
reiterated that constitutional legislation could be effected.18  Rather than strike 
COPA down as unconstitutional, the Court remanded it for a full trial based on 
new evidence regarding the Internet, COPA, and the Web.19  Should the 
government press the legislation, the remand will mark the sixth time a court 
has considered COPA.20 
Today, Congress is left with the Court’s seemingly inconsistent decisions 
and what might seem an empty promise that protective legislation is possible.  
To put the issues inherent in Internet legislation into context, Part II of this 
comment will summarize the history of obscenity and indecency law.  Part III 
will examine a case in which the Court upheld federal Internet legislation, 
United States v. American Library Association.21  Part IV will review the 
Court’s decisions regarding the CDA and COPA and carefully consider the 
differences between these two acts.  Part V will propose a solution to COPA’s 
First Amendment pitfalls and consider whether Congress should attempt to 
enact such legislation, should COPA ultimately fail.  Additionally, Part V will 
consider other ways that Congress can protect children from harmful Internet 
materials.  Part VI concludes that Congress will not be able to create COPA-
like legislation that is both constitutional and effective, although it may be able 
to attain its goal of protecting children from Internet pornography through 
other means. 
II.  HISTORY 
A. Obscenity and Indecency Law 
1. Obscenity Law 
The First Amendment to the Constitution states that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”22  Although it might seem 
that the First Amendment is composed of “plain words, easily understood,”23 
 
 17. Id. at 660–61, 673. 
 18. Id. at 672–73. 
 19. Id. 
 20. The COPA cases in chronological order are: ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. 
Pa. 1999); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); 
ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
 21. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 23. MADELEINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 3 (2d ed. 2002) (quoting Hugo L. 
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865, 874 (1960)).  Justice Black has been deemed an 
“absolutist” for his belief that the First Amendment’s language demands total protection for all 
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the Supreme Court has never interpreted the First Amendment in such an 
absolute manner.  Rather, the Court has traditionally sought to strike a balance 
between free expression and interests that necessitate protection.  Entire 
categories of speech, such as child pornography,24 libel,25 and “fighting 
words,”26 have been categorically denied the protections of the First 
Amendment as a result of the Court’s balance.  Thus, one may be civilly or 
criminally liable for these types of speech despite the First Amendment. 
Obscenity is another category of speech that does not receive First 
Amendment protection.27  Some claim that obscenity should not be protected 
because of its “dangerous effect on susceptible populations;” others claim that 
lewd expression should not contaminate other, more valuable speech.28  The 
Court, in balancing the value of free expression against its harm, has found that 
obscenities serve “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”29 
The Court’s proclamation that the First Amendment does not protect 
obscene speech was the easy part.  The Court’s next step was to determine 
what the term “obscenity” really meant.  Due process requires not only that the 
law define obscenity, but also that its definition give unambiguous notice to 
speakers whose material may fall within its meaning.30  Justice Brennan voiced 
his concern that obscenity was impossible to define with “sufficient specificity 
and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually 
oriented materials.”31  He further stated that failure to precisely define 
obscenity could result in the “substantial erosion of protected speech as a 
 
speech “without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts,’ or ‘whereases.’”  Id. (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 
U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
 24. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 752, 765 (1982).  In upholding a statute that banned 
the distribution of material depicting minors engaging in sexual performances, the Court found 
the value of the speech at issue “exceedingly modest” in comparison to the state’s interest in 
“safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor.”  Id. at 762, 756–57 (quoting 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
 25. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961). 
 26. “Fighting words” are defined as “face-to-face insults that will likely provoke a 
reasonable person to violence.”  JOHN F. WIRENIUS, FIRST AMENDMENT, FIRST PRINCIPLES: 
VERBAL ACTS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 101 (rev. ed. 2004).  This category of unprotected 
speech is strictly limited, but does still exist.  Id.; see, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362–
63 (2003) (finding that a state ban on cross-burning with the intent to intimidate does not violate 
the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 27. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973). 
 28. See NAN LEVINSON, OUTSPOKEN: FREE SPEECH STORIES 146 (2003). 
 29. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). 
 30. See id. at 27. 
 31. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech.”32  In other words, 
speakers that are not sure whether their speech amounts to obscenity might 
choose silence in the face of civil or criminal liability. 
The Court has struggled to define obscenity from the beginning.  The first 
definition of obscenity recognized in America originated from the 1868 
English case The Queen v. Hicklin.33  In Hicklin, an English man named Henry 
Scott was convicted of violating an anti-obscenity act.34  Scott distributed an 
anti-Catholic publication entitled “The Confessional Unmasked,” which 
included a discussion of “Questions Put to Females in Confession.”35  On 
appeal, the Court of Queen’s Bench found that Scott’s publication did, in fact, 
violate the anti-obscenity act and adopted the following definition of 
obscenity: “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to 
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, 
and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.”36  In addition to 
defining obscenity, Hicklin gave two standards to detect it.  The first standard 
deemed materials obscene based on how they were perceived by the most 
susceptible of people, such as a children; the second examined materials in 
isolated passages, rather than as a whole work.37  In 1896, America adopted 
Hicklin’s obscenity standards.38 
The Hicklin standard, though criticized for denying protection to a wide 
range of speech,39 defined obscenity in the United States until Roth v. United 
States reached the Supreme Court in 1957.40  In Roth, a New York publisher 
was convicted of violating a federal law that prohibited the mailing of obscene 
materials.41  The majority reiterated that obscene speech is not constitutionally 
protected and stated the following: 
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the 
full protection of the guaranties [of the First Amendment], unless excludable 
because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.  But 
 
 32. Id.; see also Michael Kahn, Bulls in the China Shop: Obscenity Law in America, 5 
BELLES LETTRES: A LITERARY REV. 23, 23 (Dec. 2004–Feb. 2005). 
 33. The Queen v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360; see also THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 133–34 (2d ed. 1993). 
 34. TEDFORD, supra note 33, at 133. 
 35. Kahn, supra note 32, at 23. 
 36. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. at 371. 
 37. See Kahn, supra note 32, at 23. 
 38. Id. (referring to the Supreme Court’s approach in Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 
(1896)). 
 39. In a 1913 obscenity case, Judge Learned Hand argued that the Hicklin test protected only 
materials deemed appropriate for a “child’s library.”  TEDFORD, supra note 33, at 134 (citing 
United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (1913)). 
 40. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 41. Id. at 480. 
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implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as 
utterly without redeeming social importance.42 
The Court further emphasized that “sex and obscenity are not synonymous,” 
and called obscenity “material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to 
prurient interest.”43  The Court declared that the First Amendment protects 
sexual content in art, literature, and scientific works.44 
The majority then articulated its new test: “whether to the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the 
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”45  This new test revised 
Hicklin’s obscenity standard in two ways.46  First, Roth required courts to 
consider the material in question as a whole, rather than in isolated passages, as 
Hicklin had required.47  Second, the Roth test measured obscenity by the values 
of the “average” person, rather than by “particularly susceptible” persons.48 
However, the obscure words with which the Court defined obscenity in 
Roth, such as “worthless,” “prurient,” and “contemporary community 
standards,” did little to create a comprehensible definition of obscenity.49  
Throughout the remainder of the 1950s and 1960s, “[t]he predictable result [of 
obscenity cases] was unpredictability.”50  Justice Potter Stewart best summed 
up the Court’s dilemma when he stated, “I could never succeed in intelligibly 
[defining obscenity].  But I know it when I see it . . . .”51 
Sixteen years later, the Court again sought to clarify its definition of 
obscenity.  Miller v. California52 provided the opportunity and led the Court to 
create today’s obscenity standard.  In Miller, the defendant was convicted of 
mailing unsolicited advertisements for pornographic books to a mother and her 
son in violation of state law.53  Seeing its opportunity to revise Roth, the Court 
handed down its new test, defining material as “obscene” if: 
 
 42. Id. at 484. 
 43. Id. at 487. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. 
 46. Kahn, supra note 32, at 24. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. “Over the next several years, the judges of the Supreme Court learned that their 
definition of obscenity was not clear to others.  Furthermore, they found that they rarely agreed 
among themselves about the meaning of their own words.”  TEDFORD, supra note 34, at 138. 
 50. Kahn, supra note 32, at 24.  “Apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no 
majority of the Court has at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what 
constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the States’ police power.”  
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973).  See generally Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 
(1967). 
 51. Kahn, supra note 32, at 23 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)). 
 52. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 53. Id. at 16–18. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] CENSORS IN CYBERSPACE 963 
(a) . . . the average person, applying contemporary community standards would 
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) . . . 
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.54 
The Miller test altered the Roth test in several important ways.  While keeping 
the “contemporary community standards” language of Roth, the Court in 
Miller interpreted the language to refer to state rather than national standards.55  
Thus, the new standard allowed states to adopt their own standards of 
obscenity.  The Miller test also required state legislatures to specifically define 
material that its anti-obscenity statutes would ban.56  Further, the Court found 
that material does not have to be “utterly without redeeming social value” as 
Roth required.57  Even if the material has some social value, states now had the 
authority to treat it as obscene. 
Because speech that meets Miller’s obscenity test is not protected by the 
First Amendment, Congress can legislate, ban, or criminalize such speech 
without First Amendment concerns.58  Indeed, Congress has criminalized 
selling, mailing, importing, and transporting obscenity, as well as the broadcast 
of obscenity over the airwaves or on cable television.59  Although there is no 
question that Congress is authorized to regulate obscenity, this authority has 
been difficult to implement where the Internet is concerned.  Parts III and IV 
will examine Congress’s struggles in detail. 
B. Indecency Law 
In Reno the Court stated that “[i]n evaluating the free speech rights of 
adults, we have made it perfectly clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is 
 
 54. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
 55. Id. at 24, 31–33.  The Miller Court further stated that “[n]othing in the First Amendment 
requires that a jury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable ‘national standards . . . .’”  Id. 
at 31.  “It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring 
that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las 
Vegas, or New York City.”  Id. at 32.  The “contemporary community standards” test has 
received a great deal of criticism.  In the case of the Internet, where the speaker reaches a 
nationwide audience, the definition of obscenity is determined by the standards of the most 
conservative community with Internet access.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877–78 (1997); see 
also WIRENIUS, supra note 26, at 94. 
 56. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 23, 27. 
 59. Emily Vander Wilt, Comment, Considering COPA: A Look at Congress’s Second 
Attempt to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 383 (2004) (citing 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1460–1468, 1470 (2000)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
964 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:957 
indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.’”60  Also 
difficult to define, the term “indecency” includes speech that “borders on 
obscenity” as well as speech that is explicit, but that has literary, artistic, 
scientific, or political value, or that otherwise falls short of Miller’s obscenity 
test.61  Indecency has been described in many different ways, such as “sexually 
explicit,”62 “lewd or lascivious, obscene or grossly vulgar, unbecoming, 
unseemly, unfit to be seen or heard, or [speech that otherwise] violates the 
proprieties of language or behavior,”63 and as speech that contains “patently 
offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities.”64  Although 
courts and legislatures have tried to define the term, the definitions are often as 
subjective and vague as the term “indecency” itself. 
Indecent speech is provided First Amendment protection; nevertheless, it 
has little social worth “in the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”65  This 
lowered value is the basis for the Court’s finding that the government can 
regulate indecent speech, in some instances, despite the First Amendment.  
Regulations based on the nature of speech are considered “content-based” 
regulations.66  The Court views government regulations based on the content of 
the speaker’s message among the most repressive and subjects such regulations 
to strict scrutiny analysis.67  Under strict scrutiny analysis, the government can 
employ content-based regulations on protected speech only if the regulations 
are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest and no other 
less restrictive means are available to achieve the government interest.68 
Although the Court has not provided a clear definition of “indecency,” it 
has created indecency doctrines that provide more or less First Amendment 
protection based on the medium the speaker uses.69  Broadcast media, for 
 
 60. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 (quoting Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 
(1989)). 
 61. Patrick M. Garry, The Flip Side of the First Amendment: A Right to Filter, 2004 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 57, 79 (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
 62. See Wilt, supra note 59, at 385. 
 63. 50 AM. JUR. 2D Lewdness, Indecency, and Obscenity § 2 (1995) (citing Commonwealth 
v. Buckley, 86 N.E. 910 (Mass. 1909), People v. Eastman, 81 N.E. 459 (N.Y. 1907), and 
Commonwealth v. Blumenstein,  133 A.2d 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957), rev’d on other grounds, 
153 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1959)). 
 64. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978). 
 65. Id. at 746. 
 66. See Ivan Hare, Method and Objectivity in Free Speech Adjudication: Lessons From 
America, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 49, 51 (2005). 
 67. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (“Content-based prohibitions  . . . 
have the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people.”); 
U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 
(1997); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
 68. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 874. 
 69. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); 
Garry, supra note 61, at 80.  For an in-depth explanation of media-based protection of indecent 
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example, receives the lowest level of First Amendment protection.70  The 
Court has reasoned that the pervasive nature of broadcast media, such as 
television and radio, justifies a lesser protection.71  It has stated that “prior 
warnings cannot completely protect the listener . . . . To say that one may avoid 
further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like 
saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.”72  
Print media, on the other hand, receives almost unlimited First Amendment 
protection. 73  The Court has stated that “[a] responsible press is an 
undoubtedly desirable goal,” although not constitutionally mandated.74 
Telecommunications and cable speech, like print speech, receive a 
heightened level of protection.  Telephone speech in the form of pre-recorded 
explicit messages, also known as “dial-a-porn,” has sparked the most 
controversy.  In the landmark decision Sable Communications of California v. 
FCC, 75  the Court considered the constitutionality of Communications Act 
amendments that absolutely banned obscene and indecent prerecorded 
messages.76  The Court held that an absolute ban on indecent speech would 
violate the First Amendment by denying adults their right to engage in 
protected speech and would result in “limiting the content of adult telephone 
conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear.”77  Furthermore, 
hearing an explicit message requires taking the “affirmative steps” of dialing a 
 
speech, see Bradley J. Stein, Comment, Why Wait? A Discussion of Analogy and Judicial 
Standards for the Internet in Light of the Supreme Court’s Reno v. ACLU Opinion, 42 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 1471 (1998). 
 70. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.  In Pacifica, the defendant radio station aired George Carlin’s 
aptly entitled comedy routine, “Filthy Words.”  Id. at 729–30.  The Court upheld the FCC’s 
finding that the broadcast was indecent and that its prohibition was consistent with the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 731–32, 748–51.  See generally MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY 
WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 119–30 (1986). 
 71. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49. 
 72. Id. at 49. 
 73. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–58 (1974).  In Miami 
Herald, the Supreme Court considered whether a Florida statute that required newspapers to grant 
political candidates equal space, at no cost, to reply to criticism violated the First Amendment.  
Id. at 244–45.  The Court emphasized that print speech receives the highest level of First 
Amendment protection and stated: 
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on 
the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—
whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet 
to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised 
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this 
time. 
Id. at 258. 
 74. Id. at 256. 
 75. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
 76. Id. at 118. 
 77. Id. at 131. 
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“1-900 number,” unlike broadcast media where one must simply turn on the 
television.78  The Court also found telephone speech less pervasive than 
broadcast and declined to reduce its First Amendment protection.79 
The Court has regarded speech in cable media as “[t]he closest precedent” 
to Internet speech, and, tellingly for the future of the Internet, has provided it a 
heightened level of protection.80  In the recent decision United States v. 
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., the Court examined section 505 of the 
Telecommunications Act.81  Congress created the Act to protect children from 
imprecise scrambling that sometimes allowed discernable sounds or images to 
reach viewers.82  The Act required cable providers to either scramble sexually 
explicit channels in full or to limit explicit programming to hours when 
children would be less likely to see them.83 
The Court in Playboy found that the Act restricted speech based on its 
content and applied its strict scrutiny test.84  Cable television allows viewers 
the option to block the transmission of unwanted channels, unlike broadcast 
media.85  The Court found that this alternative clashed with the government’s 
argument that the Act was the least restrictive means available to meet its 
purpose.86  Thus, the Court held the Act restricted protected speech in violation 
of the First Amendment.87 
III.  PREVIOUS FEDERAL INTERNET LEGISLATION AND THE COURT 
In addition to understanding obscenity and indecency law, it is important 
to consider the Court’s previous rulings regarding Internet legislation to better 
predict where Internet regulation may be headed.  In response to the increasing 
number of library patrons, including minors, accessing Internet pornography 
from public libraries, Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act of 
2000 (CIPA).88  CIPA provided that a public school or library may not receive 
federal assistance to provide Internet access unless it installs software to block 
 
 78. Id. at 127–28. 
 79. Id. at 128, 130–31. 
 80. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004). 
 81. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  To comply with the statute, most cable operators eliminated the transmission of 
indecent programming between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.  Id. at 806–07.  “[F]or two-thirds of the day no 
household in those service areas could receive the programming, whether or not the 
household . . . wanted to do so.”  Id. at 807. 
 84. Id. at 813. 
 85. Id. at 815. 
 86. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815–16. 
 87. Id. at 827. 
 88. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A–335 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000) and 
various sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
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images that constitute obscenity or child pornography.89  Several plaintiffs, 
including groups of public libraries, library associations, library patrons, and 
Web publishers, challenged the Act in United States v. American Library 
Ass’n.90  Plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that CIPA induced libraries to 
violate the First Amendment rights of adult library patrons.91  In a plurality 
opinion, the Supreme Court disagreed.92 
In its opinion, the Court first considered the level of scrutiny it should 
apply to CIPA and chose not to apply heightened scrutiny because “public 
libraries seek to provide materials ‘that would be of the greatest direct benefit 
or interest to the community,’”93 rather than “a public forum for Web 
publishers to express themselves.”94  Next, the Court emphasized that CIPA 
would affect only federal funds intended to assist libraries in obtaining 
educational and informational material.95  The Court found that Congress could 
condition receipt of funds on whether they are used in the manner anticipated 
and authorized.96 
Although the blocking software CIPA required sometimes filtered out 
protected material, this flaw was not fatal.97  CIPA permitted patrons that 
wished to disable filters to do so on request.98  A final point made by the Court 
 
 89. § 1712, 114 Stat. at 2763A–340. 
 90. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 91. Id. at 210. 
 92. Id. at 214.  Before CIPA reached the Supreme Court, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held CIPA to violate the First Amendment.  Am. Library 
Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 490 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  
The district court found that the Act was not narrowly tailored and that less-restrictive alternatives 
existed.  Id. at 475–84.  The finding largely resulted from evidence that suggested filtering 
technology is often “underblocking” or “overblocking,” and likely to either fail to filter out 
explicit material or to block protected material.  Id. at 476–77. 
 93. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 204 (quoting Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 421). 
 94. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206.  The Court emphasized that a public library is not a 
public forum, and Internet services in libraries are not intended to aid in the free expression of 
Web providers.  Id.  Rather, the Internet is a technological extension of the books intended “to 
facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite and 
appropriate quality.”  Id. 
 95. Id. at 211–12.  The Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) is one program that 
provides public funding.  Id. at 211 n.5.  LSTA’s goal is to encourage excellence and promote 
patrons’ access to library resources.  Id.  Another program, E-rate, is intended to allow patrons to 
access a variety of different resources.  Id. 
 96. Id. at 214. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. at 209.  However, libraries would not unblock a site unless it was for “bona fide 
research or other lawful purposes,” even for an adult.  Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) 
(2000)).  The district court viewed this as inadequate because embarrassment could discourage 
patrons from doing so.  Id.  The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court’s finding, stating 
that “the Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a public library 
without any risk of embarrassment.”  Id. 
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was that CIPA, unlike COPA or the CDA, did not criminalize the failure to 
follow its guidelines.99  Rather, the Act merely withheld federal funds if its 
requirements were not met.100 
IV.  HEIGHTENED PROTECTION FOR INTERNET SPEECH: RENO AND ASHCROFT 
Reno has been called the first decision to “define the legal boundaries of 
free expression in the age of the Internet.”101  Although the CDA ultimately 
failed, the Court’s decision in Reno led the way for the later creation of 
COPA.102  This Section will explain the terms of the CDA and why the Court 
found it inconsistent with First Amendment rights.  Section B will detail how 
Congress remade the CDA and created COPA, in a second attempt to protect 
children from harmful Internet speech.  Finally, Section C will follow COPA’s 
journey through the courts. 
A. The Communications Decency Act: Reno v. ACLU 
1. The CDA 
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 into effect.103  Although much of the Act was aimed at promoting 
competition in the telephone service market, Title V, the CDA, addressed 
Congress’s concern with the accessibility of indecent Internet communications 
to minors.104  The CDA was enacted without extensive hearings or commission 
reports, unlike other portions of the Telecommunications Act.105 
 
 99. See Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL BOUNDARIES 98 (2000). 
 102. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 103. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at 
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (2000)); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 
1996). 
 104. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 826–27. 
 105. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997).  In a one-day hearing on “Cyberporn and 
Children,” Senator Leahy remarked: 
It really struck me . . . that it is the first ever hearing . . . . And yet we had a major debate 
on the floor, passed legislation overwhelmingly on a subject involving the Internet, 
legislation that could dramatically change—some would say even wreak havoc—on the 
Internet.  The Senate went in willy-nilly, passed legislation, and never once had a hearing, 
never once had a discussion other than an hour or so on the floor. 
Id. at 858 n.24 (citing Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, The State of the 
Technology, and the Need for Congressional Action: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 7-8 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
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The CDA, in an attempt to protect minors from harmful Internet material, 
contained an “indecent transmission” provision and a “patently offensive 
display” provision.  The indecent transmission provision, contained in § 
223(a), prohibited the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages 
to a recipient under 18 years of age.106  The patently offensive display 
provision, § 223(d), prohibited the knowing sending or displaying of patently 
offensive messages so as to make it available to a person under 18 years of 
age.107   
Under the CDA, Internet speakers that knowingly sent or posted prohibited 
material could be fined, imprisoned for up to two years, or both.108  However, 
the Act also included two affirmative defenses.  If a speaker could prove that 
he had taken “good faith, reasonable, effective and appropriate actions under 
the circumstances” to keep minors from accessing the communication or that 
he required age verification by credit card or an adult verification number 
before transmitting offensive material, he could then avoid the CDA’s 
penalties.109 
 
 106. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000).  The Act provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Whoever—(1) in interstate or foreign communications . . . (B) by means of a 
telecommunications device knowingly—(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the 
transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other 
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the 
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such 
communication placed the call or initiated the communication . . . (E) . . . (2) knowingly 
permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity 
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be 
fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
Id. 
 107. Id. § 223(d) (2000).  This section states: 
(d) Whoever—(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly—(A) uses an 
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of 
age . . . (B) . . . any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other 
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, 
regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the 
communication . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
Id. 
 108. Id. § 223 (a), (d). 
 109. Id. §223 (e).  This section provides: 
(5) It is a defense . . . that a person—(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, 
and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to 
a communication . . . or (B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use 
of a verified credit card . . . or adult personal identification number. 
Id. 
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2. The District Court Considers the CDA 
Immediately after President Clinton signed the CDA into effect, twenty 
plaintiffs, including non-profit organizations and free speech advocates, 
challenged the constitutionality of the Act.110  The Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania heard ACLU v. Reno and considered whether to grant the 
plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.111  The court began by making 
extensive findings of fact regarding computers, the Internet and the CDA.112  
The court found Internet speech to be “as diverse as human thought.”113  On 
the Internet, the court found, one can be both a speaker and a member of the 
audience, and reach a wide audience at little cost.114  A three-judge panel wrote 
three separate opinions and granted the injunction.115 
Chief Judge Sloviter subjected the Act to strict scrutiny, likening the 
CDA’s regulations to those in telecommunications cases, such as Sable.116  The 
judge concluded that the Act “sweeps more broadly than necessary and thereby 
chills the expression of adults,” and that the terms “patently offensive” and 
“indecent” were inherently vague.117  The judge further found that the CDA’s 
affirmative defenses were neither technologically nor economically feasible for 
many Internet speakers, and therefore, were not narrowly tailored to meet strict 
scrutiny analysis.118  Thus, the CDA was unconstitutional.119 
Judge Buckwalter concluded that the terms “patently offensive,” 
“indecent,” and “in context” were unconstitutionally vague; thus, the criminal 
enforcement of either section would implicate the First and Fifth 
Amendments.120  He was particularly troubled by the regulation of indecent 
material, as indecency may not be devoid of literary, artistic, political, or 
 
 110. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 8227 (E.D. Pa. 1996).  Plaintiffs included 
organizations such as Stop Prisoner Rape, AIDS Education Global Information System, and 
Planned Parenthood Foundation of America, Inc., but no commercial pornographers.  Id. at 825–
27 & n.2.  A second suit was later filed by twenty-seven additional plaintiffs, including the 
American Library Association, Microsoft Corporation, and Health Sciences Libraries 
Consortium.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861–62 & n.28 (1997).  Because of the vagueness of 
the terms, the CDA could have imposed criminal penalties on these organizations because their 
Web-sites contained material that could be considered “indecent” and “patently offensive,” even 
though their material is educational or informational in nature.  See id. at 870–72. 
 111. ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 826. 
 112. Id. at 830–49. 
 113. Id. at 842. 
 114. Id. at 842–44. 
 115. Id. at 826, 849, 857, 865, 883. 
 116. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851.  See discussion of telecommunications media and indecency 
regulation, supra Part II.B. 
 117. Id. at 854, 858. 
 118. Id. at 854. 
 119. Id. at 857. 
 120. Id. at 858. 
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scientific value, unlike obscenity.121  Judge Dalzell, on the other hand, found 
that the “special attributes of Internet communication” denied Congress the 
power to regulate protected Internet speech.122  Thus, although each judge’s 
opinion rested on different grounds, their conclusions were the same: a 
resounding “no” to the CDA’s enforcement. 
3. The Supreme Court Hears Reno 
Reno reached the Supreme Court on expedited review. 123  The Court, in a 
6-3 decision, upheld the district court’s injunction.124  Justice Stevens, writing 
for the Court, began his opinion by considering First Amendment cases dealing 
with other forms of media and distinguishing them based on both the language 
of the CDA and the special characteristics of the Internet.125 
The Court first considered Ginsberg v. New York,126 a case that upheld a 
statute that prohibited the sale of obscene material to minors.127  The Court 
found that the CDA swept much more broadly than the statute in Ginsberg.128  
Most importantly, the Court noted that the CDA, unlike the statute in 
Ginsberg, was not limited to commercial transactions.129  Further, the CDA 
differed from the statute in Ginsberg in that it lacked the “utterly without 
redeeming social importance” component of the obscenity definition and failed 
to define what constituted prohibited indecent speech.130  Finally, the Court 
criticized the fact that the CDA included minors over seventeen years of age 
within its protected class.131 
The Court went on to reject the government’s contention that Pacifica,132 
which gave a lowered First Amendment protection to broadcast media, should 
 
 121. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 863. 
 122. Id. at 877.  The characteristics of the Internet, such as its “low barriers to entry,” and 
“significant access to all who wish to speak in the medium,” led Judge Dalzell to proclaim that a 
proper conclusion may be that “Congress may not regulate indecency on the Internet at all.”  Id. 
 123. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  The district court case was decided on June 11, 
1996.  ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824.  The case was argued before the Supreme Court only nine 
months later on March 19, 1997.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 844. 
 124. Reno, 521 U.S. at 848–49. 
 125. Id. at 849, 864–71. 
 126. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).  Ginsberg arose after the owner of a luncheonette and stationary 
shop in Bellmore, Long Island, sold a “girlie” magazine to a sixteen-year-old boy.  Id. at 631.  
The boy’s mother had asked the boy to buy the magazine in order to demonstrate that minors 
could purchase such literature from Sam’s.  TEDFORD, supra note 33, at 141.  The boy’s mother 
then turned the shop owner, Sam Ginsberg, over to police.  Id. 
 127. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 865–66. 
 132. FCC v. Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).  Pacifica is discussed supra Part I.B. 
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apply to uphold the CDA.133  The Court distinguished Pacifica on three 
grounds.  First, the order upheld in Pacifica was made by a regulatory agency 
that narrowly targeted its order at a specific broadcast, unlike the CDA’s 
“broad categorical prohibitions” that are not “dependent on any evaluation by 
an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet.”134  Second, 
the order at issue in Pacifica was not punitive and did not hold the CDA’s 
harsh penalties.135  Finally, the Court emphasized that the CDA does not 
legislate broadcast media, which has traditionally received the least First 
Amendment protection.136  The Court noted that the Internet varied greatly 
from other mediums, and found that cases involving other media added 
nothing to the analysis of free speech and the Internet.137 
The Court then emphasized the vagueness of the CDA and its potential to 
chill protected speech.138  Echoing the district court’s findings, Justice Stevens 
wrote that the Act’s regulation of “patently offensive material” and “indecent 
transmissions” and its failure to define either term rendered the statute 
unconstitutionally vague.139  Further, “with penalties including up to two years 
in prison for each act of violation, [t]he severity of criminal sanctions may well 
cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate.”140  Justice Stevens 
emphasized the unique nature of the Internet, and stated that “any person with 
a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it 
could from any soapbox.”141  Thus, the CDA’s ambiguous standards, in 
combination with its harsh criminal penalties presented “a great[] threat of 
censoring speech” in this expansive new medium.142 
The Court further held that the CDA was overbroad,143 likening the Act’s 
blanket restrictions to those held unconstitutional in Sable.144  The Court wrote 
that, “[g]iven the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the 
absence of a viable age verification process, the sender must be charged with 
knowing that one or more minors will likely view it.”145  The Court continued: 
“Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person chat 
group will be a minor—and therefore that it would be a crime to send the 
 
 133. Reno, 521 U.S. at 866–67. 
 134. Id. at 867. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Reno, 521 U.S. at 873–74. 
 139. Id. at 873. 
 140. Id. at 872. 
 141. Id. at 870. 
 142. Id. at 874. 
 143. Reno, 521 U.S. at 877.  “The breadth of the CDA’s coverage is wholly unprecedented.”  
Id. 
 144. Id. at 875. 
 145. Id. at 876. 
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group an indecent message—would surely burden communication among 
adults.”146  Without technology to allow adults, but not minors, to access such 
messages, the CDA’s burden was too heavy.  Moreover, the CDA’s broad 
scope would criminalize indecent speech that is protected for adults, such as 
discussions regarding sexually transmitted diseases, prison rape, abortion,147 
and other valuable but indecent Internet speech, whether commercial or 
otherwise. 
The Court further concluded that the Act was not narrowly tailored to meet 
the government’s interest.148  Plaintiffs maintained that filtering software or 
tagging would allow parents to control the Internet materials that their children 
could access. 149  Moreover, the age verification and adult identification 
numbers that constitute an affirmative defense to the CDA would not be 
economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers and would not prevent 
minors from posing as adults.150  The Court ultimately found that the CDA 
placed an unreasonable burden on speech, and that its affirmative defenses 
were not narrowly tailored to save the “otherwise patently invalid 
unconstitutional provision.”151 
B. The Child Online Protection Act: Ashcroft v. ACLU 
1. The CDA Becomes COPA 
The Supreme Court declared the CDA unconstitutional on June 26, 
1997.152 Within five months, a determined Congress began considering 
proposals for a new Internet protection bill.153  This time Congress carefully 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 874–75, 878.  “In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it 
perfectly clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First 
Amendment.’”  Id. (quoting Sable Commc’n of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
 148. Reno, 521 U.S. at 879. 
 149. Id. at 881.  “Tagging” refers to the requirement that an Internet speaker electronically 
designate his or her speech as indecent, thus allowing screening software to detect and block the 
material.  Id.  The government argued that tagging would constitute “good faith, reasonable, 
effective, and appropriate actions” under the affirmative defense portion of the act.  Id.  This did 
not save the CDA, however, as screening software did not exist at the time of trial, nor was it 
shown that such software would be effective if it did exist.  Id. 
 150. Id. at 881–82. 
 151. Id. at 882.  The Court remarked that the CDA’s overbreadth and restriction on adult 
speech to protect minors amounted to “burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.”  Id. (quoting Sable 
Commc’n of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989)).  In response to the Court’s decision, U.S. 
Sen. Patrick Leahy has remarked: “The Supreme Court has made clear that we do not forfeit our 
First Amendment rights when we go online.  This decision is a landmark in the history of the 
Internet and a firm foundation for its future growth.”  LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 101, at 98. 
 152. Reno, 521 U.S. at 844. 
 153. Wilt, supra note 59, at 378. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
974 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:957 
aligned its legislation with the Reno decision.154  The Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation conducted two hearings on harmful 
Internet materials, to some extent in response to the Court’s criticism for its 
failure to do so before passing the CDA.155  A new bill made its way through 
Congress.156  Within the year, President Clinton signed the Child Online 
Protection Act into law.157 
COPA imposed as much as $50,000 in fines and six months in prison on 
Web publishers who knowingly posted Internet material that was both harmful 
to minors and posted for commercial purposes.158  COPA borrowed its 
definition of “material that is harmful to minors” from Miller’s three-prong 
obscenity test: 
The term “material that is harmful to minors” means any communication . . . 
that is obscene or that— 
  (A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is 
designed to appeal to . . . the prurient interest; 
  (B) depicts . . . in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an 
actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal 
or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent 
female breast; and 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 379. 
 158. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (2000).  The Act states: 
(1) Prohibited conduct 
  Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in 
interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any 
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes 
any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned 
not more than 6 months, or both. 
(2) Intentional violations 
  In addition to the penalties under paragraph (1), whoever intentionally violates such 
paragraph shall be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each violation. . . . 
(3) Civil penalty 
  In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1) and (2), whoever violates paragraph 
(1) shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation. . . . 
Id.  A person acts for commercial purposes only if “such person is engaged in the business of 
making such communications.”  § 231(e)(2)(A).  “Engaged in business” means that “the person 
who makes a communication, or offers to make a communication, by means of the World Wide 
Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes time, attention, or labor to such 
activities, as a regular course of such person’s trade or business, with the objective of earning a 
profit as a result of such activities.”  § 231(e)(2)(B). 
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  (C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value for minors.159 
COPA, like the CDA, set forth affirmative defenses.160  Under the Act, a 
Web publisher that required a credit card or other adult verification before 
granting access to the site or used other reasonable means to verify a user’s age 
would escape COPA’s criminal and civil penalties.161 
At first glance, COPA and the CDA appear similar.  Both regulate indecent 
materials on the Internet, stiffly penalize those who violate their regulations 
and provide some speakers with an affirmative defense.162  However, Congress 
made three important changes when it reinvented the CDA.  First, it limited 
COPA to commercial speech.163  In Reno, the Court repeatedly suggested that 
regulation of commercial Web sites would pass First Amendment scrutiny.164  
In finding the CDA unconstitutional, the majority distinguished the Act from 
Ginsberg based, in part, on the fact that the Act upheld in Ginsberg regulated 
only commercial entities.165  In Reno, the Court also discussed the effects of 
forcing non-commercial Web publishers to require a credit card or password 
before allowing entry onto their sites due to the cost of doing so.166  The Court 
stated that such an imposition on non-commercial sites would impose 
substantial costs on such Web sites and would require many to shut down.167  It 
seemed the Court would hold regulations of commercial sites to a lower 
standard. 
Secondly, COPA applied only to materials displayed on the World Wide 
Web, and exempted material found in e-mails and chatrooms.168  The CDA 
was extremely broad in that it regulated all Internet speech.169  The Court in 
Reno was particularly concerned that speakers would be unable to verify the 
ages of those that received messages in chat rooms and other open Internet 
 
 159. § 231(e)(6); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 14, 24–25 (1973). 
 160. COPA provides the following affirmative defenses: 
It is an affirmative defense . . . that the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by minors to 
material that is harmful to minors— 
(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal 
identification number; 
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or 
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology. 
§ 231(c)(1). 
 161. See §§ 231 (COPA), 223 (CDA). 
 162. § 231. 
 163. §§ 231(a)(1), 223(a). 
 164. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 856. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See § 231(a). 
 169. See § 223(a). 
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forums.170  A speaker’s knowledge that “one or more members of a 100-person 
chat group will be a minor” would make that speaker liable under the CDA for 
an indecent message he or she sends.171  The district court had previously 
determined that there “is no effective way to determine the identity or the age 
of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups 
or chat rooms.”172  Thus, the CDA would chill such indecent speech that is 
protected as to adults.173  COPA remedied this problem.  Through commonly 
used technology, Web publishers would be able to require age verification or 
passwords before allowing entry onto their Web sites.174 
Finally, Congress changed the CDA’s language.  The CDA regulated 
“indecent” and “patently offensive” material.175  The CDA did not define 
either term, which created unconstitutional vagueness that could chill 
speech.176  In COPA, Congress changed the Act to target “material that is 
harmful to minors,”177 and defined the phrase using Miller’s obscenity 
standard.178  Material that is obscene under Miller’s three-prong test receives 
no constitutional protection.  Although Congress believed it was merely 
regulating unprotected obscenity, the courts disagreed. 
2. COPA Meets the Courts 
Much to the chagrin of its supporters, but to no one’s surprise, COPA’s 
beginnings mirrored those of the CDA.179  On October 22, 1998, just one day 
after President Clinton signed COPA into law, seventeen plaintiffs filed suit in 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.180  The 
 
 170. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876. 
 171. Id. 
 172. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 173. Reno, 521 U.S. at 877; see also 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH §14:66 (2005). 
 174. See § 223(c). 
 175. § 223(a), (d). 
 176. “‘Indecent’ does not benefit from any textual embellishment at all.  ‘Patently offensive’ 
is qualified only to the extent that it involves ‘sexual or excretory activities or organs’ taken ‘in 
context’ and ‘measured by temporary community standards.’”  Reno, 521 U.S. at 871 n.35.  In 
Reno, the Court distinguished the statute that was found constitutional in Ginsberg based on the 
statute’s narrow definition of “indecent” to include only materials that are harmful to minors and 
“utterly without redeeming social importance.”  Id. at 865–66. 
 177. 47 U.S.C. §§ 231(a)(1), (e)(6). 
 178. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 179. “The pattern of Congress passing legislation and then it being instantly challenged has 
been repeated over and over again during the past seven years.”  Susan Hanley Kosse, Try, Try 
Again: Will Congress Ever Get it Right? A Summary of Internet Pornography Laws Protecting 
Children and Possible Solutions, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 721, 723 (2004). 
 180. Wilt, supra note 59, at 395. 
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plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Act and 
under the First and Fifth Amendments.181 
After five days of testimony, the court rendered sixty-seven separate 
findings of fact relating to the Internet, COPA, and the Web.182  Among its 
most important findings was that once material is posted on the Web, the 
speaker cannot prevent the speech from going to a particular geographic 
area.183  The court also found that “age verification screens,” a possible 
affirmative defense to COPA’s penalties, could potentially cost Web 
publishers thousands of dollars to implement.184  COPA’s other defense, adult 
age verification, would require an Internet user to pay a yearly fee in order to 
obtain an Adult Check PIN.185 
In an opinion authored by Judge Reed, the court found that COPA must be 
subjected to strict scrutiny analysis, as it was a content-based regulation.186  
The Court noted that “[a]lthough there are lower standards of scrutiny where 
the regulation of general broadcast media or ‘commercial’ speech . . . are 
involved, neither is appropriate here.”187  It rejected the government’s 
argument that the lowered scrutiny applied to the broadcast medium should be 
applied to internet speech.188  Thus, the court determined that COPA must: 1) 
serve a compelling government interest; 2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest; and 3) be the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.189 
Although the court found that protecting children is a compelling 
government interest,190 it found that COPA was not narrowly tailored for two 
reasons.  First, COPA was not likely to meet the “least restrictive means” 
test.191  Although imperfect, blocking and filtering technology could block 
material from other countries and material in emails and chatrooms without 
 
 181. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (1999) [hereinafter COPA I].  Plaintiffs 
advanced three claims: (1) that COPA was invalid on its face and as applied to them under the 
First Amendment due to its burden on constitutionally protected adult speech; (2) that COPA 
violated the rights of minors; and (3) that COPA was unconstitutionally vague under the First and 
Fifth Amendments.  Id. 
 182. Id. at 477, 481–92. 
 183. Id. at 484. 
 184. Id. at 488. 
 185. Id. at 489–90.  Approximately twenty-five services on the Web provided such adult PIN 
services at the time the district court heard the evidence.  Id. at 489. 
 186. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493.  Content-based regulations of speech are presumptively 
invalid and subject to strict scrutiny.  Id.  The Court wrote, “As a matter of constitutional 
tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of 
the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage 
it.”  Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997)). 
 187. Id. at 492–93. 
 188. Id. at 493. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 495. 
 191. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496–97. 
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burdening adult speech.192  COPA, on the other hand, would have left these 
materials untouched.193  There was also evidence that minors could have the 
ability to legitimately possess credit or debit cards that would allow them to 
access harmful materials despite COPA’s screening mechanisms.194  Thus, the 
court found filtering and blocking software to be a less restrictive and more 
effective alternative to protect minors.195 
Second, the court found COPA overbroad and noted the “sweeping . . . 
forms of content” that COPA restricted.196  COPA prohibited “any 
communication, picture, image, graphic image file . . . writing, or any other 
matter of any kind.”197  The court recommended that Congress limit its 
restrictions to cover only pictures, images, or graphic image files.198  The court 
went on to suggest other changes Congress might make to create a 
constitutional statute.  Bothered by COPA’s harsh penalties, the court 
suggested that Congress employ lesser sanctions or incorporate COPA’s 
affirmative defenses into the elements of the crime itself.199  The court 
concluded that the Act was not narrowly tailored and was unconstitutionally 
overbroad.200  The district court granted the preliminary injunction, holding 
that plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits.201 
3. COPA Is Appealed to the Third Circuit 
On appeal, Judge Garth, writing for the Third Circuit, affirmed the 
injunction on different grounds.202  Rather than relying on the district court’s 
finding that COPA was not narrowly tailored, the court considered COPA’s 
“contemporary community standards” criterion of judging whether materials 
are harmful to minors.203  Although the use of a community standards 
evaluation had been upheld in the analysis of other media,204 the court found 
this standard troublesome in the context of the Internet.205 
The district court had found that the Internet, unlike broadcast, telephone, 
and cable media, does not allow the speaker to control the dissemination of his 
 
 192. Id. at 497. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 496–97. 
 195. Id. at 497. 
 196. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 498. 
 202. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter COPA II]. 
 203. Id. at 166. 
 204. Id. at 175 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974); Sable Commc’n of 
Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125–26 (1989)). 
 205. COPA II, 217 F.3d at 166. 
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material.206  Since a Web publisher’s speech is available to everyone with an 
Internet connection, and there exists no geographical “community” for Internet 
speech, the Third Circuit reasoned that Web publishers would have to abide by 
the “standards of the community most likely to be offended by the 
message.”207  Based on this sole provision of the statute, and without 
addressing the district court’s holding, the Third Circuit found COPA 
unconstitutionally overbroad.208 
4. COPA’s First Trip to the Supreme Court 
The government appealed the Third Circuit’s narrow holding—that 
COPA’s contemporary “community standards” criterion was 
unconstitutionally overbroad—to the Supreme Court.209  In an 8-to-1 decision 
authored by Justice Thomas, the Court vacated and remanded the Third 
Circuit’s ruling.210  After reviewing the Reno decision and the two prior 
decisions in this case, the Court held that the “reliance on community standards 
to identify ‘material that is harmful to minors’ does not by itself render the 
statue substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment.”211  The 
Court stressed that “community standards need not be defined by reference to a 
precise geographic area.”212  Rather, jurors could judge whether material is 
harmful to minors based on their personal knowledge.213 
Although the members of the Court overwhelmingly agreed with COPA 
II’s holding, they produced several opinions,214 foreshadowing that COPA had 
not yet overcome the last of its obstacles.  The Court stressed that it would not 
 
 206. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495. 
Web publishers cannot restrict access to their site based on the geographic locale of the 
Internet user visiting their site. In fact, “an Internet user cannot foreclose access to . . . 
work from certain states or send differing versions of . . . communication[s] to different 
jurisdictions . . .  The Internet user has no ability to bypass any particular state.” 
COPA II, 217 F.3d at 176 (quoting Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997)). 
 207. Id. at 177 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877–78 (1997)). 
 208. Id. at 178–81.  Although the court affirmed the preliminary injunction, it did so 
reluctantly.  The Third Circuit quoted the Supreme Court’s Reno opinion: “[S]ometimes we must 
make decisions that we do not like.  We make them because they are right, right in the sense that 
the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.”  Id. at 181 (quoting Reno v. 
ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 498 (1999)).  The Third Circuit further expressed its confidence that 
developing technology would “soon render the community standards challenge moot.”  Id. 
 209. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) [hereinafter COPA III]. 
 210. Id. at 566, 586. 
 211. Id. at 585. 
 212. Id. at 576. 
 213. Id. at 576–77 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974)). 
 214. Justices O’Connor and Breyer filed separate opinions and concurred in the judgment.  Id. 
at 586–91. Justice Kennedy entered another concurring opinion, joined by Justices Souter and 
Ginsberg.  Id. at 591–602.  Justice Stevens entered a dissenting opinion.  Id. at 602–12. 
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consider whether COPA would pass constitutional scrutiny in other respects 
and would not address issues raised by the district court.215  The Court vacated 
the Third Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, 
while upholding the preliminary injunction.216 
5. Back to the Third Circuit 
On remand, the Third Circuit reconsidered the district court’s grant of a 
preliminary injunction, this time in light of the many opinions authored by the 
Supreme Court.217  In subjecting COPA to strict scrutiny, the court found that 
the government did have a compelling interest in protecting children; however, 
COPA’s provisions were not narrowly tailored to meet this goal. 218  The court 
took issue with three provisions of COPA.219 
COPA’s regulations targeted material designed to appeal to the prurient 
interests of minors, a judgment left to “the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards” and “taking the material as a whole.”220  
Under the First Amendment, all speech must be evaluated in context, rather 
than in isolation, to determine the level of protection it should receive.221  
Otherwise, a mere photograph in a book or scene in a movie could render an 
entire work obscene.222  For this reason, the court found COPA’s plain terms 
troublesome.223  As the court noted, COPA regulates “any communication, 
picture, image file . . . or other matter of any kind,” that appeals to the prurient 
interest of minors, making it difficult to apply the “as a whole” standard.224  
Under COPA’s plain terms, each individual communication or image would be 
considered “a whole” by itself.225 
The court next found the term “minor,” defined in the statute as “any 
person under 17 years of age,” troublesome. 226  Because “minor” could cover 
persons from infancy to age seventeen, Web publishers would not know what 
 
 215. COPA III, 535 U.S. at 585–86. 
 216. Id. 
 217. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter COPA IV]. 
 218. Id. at 251. 
 219. Id. 
 220. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(6) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 221. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 252. 
 222. See generally id. 
 223. Id. at 252–53. 
 224. Id. at 252.  “It is unclear whether what is to be judged as a whole is a single image on a 
Web page, a whole Web page, an entire multipage Web site, or an interlocking set of Web sites.”  
Id. (quoting COPA III, 535 U.S. 564, 593 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 225. Id. at 253.  The court gave the example of a sexual image within a collection of art.  Id. 
Although such an image could be deemed harmful by itself, it might not “appeal to the prurient 
interest” if viewed in the context of an art collection.  Id. 
 226. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7) (2000); COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 253–54. 
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standards their material must meet.227  The court wrote that “materials that 
have ‘serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value’ for a sixteen-year-
old [do not] have the same value for a minor who is three years old.”228  
Moreover, since the Act covered such a wide age range, it would regulate a 
great deal of protected Internet speech.229  In this respect, too, COPA was not 
narrowly tailored so as to survive strict scrutiny.230 
Additionally, the court found that COPA’s limited coverage of commercial 
speech still did not sufficiently limit COPA’s scope.231  The Act’s expansive 
definition of “engaged in the business,” covered “any person whose 
communication ‘includes any material that is harmful to minors’ and who 
devotes time . . . to such activities as a regular course of such person’s trade or 
business, with the objective of earning a profit.”232  Thus, the Act would apply 
to commercial pornographers as well as those who merely sell goods or 
services on the Web or simply seek to earn revenue from Internet traffic, as 
long as some part of their Web-site contains harmful material.233 
Finally, the court found that COPA’s affirmative defenses were not 
sufficiently narrowed.234  To avoid penalty under COPA, Web-publishers must 
require age verification or employ other reasonable measures to ensure that 
minors do not gain access to their harmful material.235  However, the court 
feared that age verification screens would cause Web-publishers to lose some 
adult users and otherwise burden speech.236  Further, affirmative defenses do 
not prevent prosecution, and they leave the burden of proof with the speaker.237  
Filtering and other technological means would prevent minors from accessing 
sites harmful to them without burdening protected adult speech.238 
The court did not stop with holding that COPA was not narrowly tailored 
to meet the government’s interest of protecting minors.  Mirroring the district 
 
 227. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 254. 
 228. Id. at 253–54. 
 229. See id. at 258–61. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 256. 
 232. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 256 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B) (2000)). 
 233. Id.  The court pointed to the district court’s finding that approximately one-third of all 
Web-sites could be included in COPA’s expansive definition of “commercial purposes.”  Id. at 
257. 
 234. Id. at 259. 
 235. § 231(c)(1). 
 236. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 259.  In particular, the court expressed its fear that adults would 
be unwilling to provide personal information, such as a credit card number, especially if the 
material they wish to access is sensitive or controversial.  Id.  The founder of PlanetOut, a gay 
and lesbian Web-site, stated that many people would stop using the site if users were forced to 
identify themselves.  Adam Cohen, Cyberspeech on Trial, TIME, Feb. 15, 1999, at 52. 
 237. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 260. 
 238. Id. 
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court’s opinion, the court found blocking and filtering technology to be a less-
restrictive way to protect children from harmful Internet material.239  The court 
concluded by going beyond the issues it was handed by the Supreme Court and 
the district court, perhaps in attempt to remedy the narrowness of its first 
opinion.240  The court held that COPA was overbroad, relying on the same 
provisions that led to its finding that COPA was not narrowly tailored: the 
inability to evaluate prohibited material “as a whole,” the Act’s broad 
definition of both “minor” and “commercial purposes,” and the chilling effect 
of its affirmative defenses.241  The court again wrote that the “community 
standards” provision rendered COPA overbroad.242  Thus, the court found that 
COPA was not narrowly tailored, did not represent the least restrictive means 
available, and was unconstitutionally overbroad.243  The Third Circuit upheld 
the injunction a second time.244 
6. The Court Hears COPA V 
a. A Divided Court 
Again, the government appealed the Third Circuit’s decision.245  And, for 
the second time, the Supreme Court considered whether COPA violated the 
First Amendment protections provided to Internet speech.246  On June 29, 
2004, in a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that COPA was not the least 
restrictive means available to meet the government’s interest.247  Justice 
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Thomas and Ginsburg.248 
The Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis, again giving the government 
the burden to prove that the Act was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
government interest and that the Act was the least restrictive means 
available.249  The Court first examined whether COPA had employed the least 
restrictive available alternative to regulate harmful Internet speech.250  The 
Court noted that the district court had found blocking and filtering technology 
 
 239. Id. at 265. 
 240. Id. at 266–70. 
 241. Id. 
 242. COPA IV, 322 F.3d at 270. 
 243. Id. at 251, 265–66. 
 244. Id. at 271. 
 245. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) [hereinafter COPA V]. 
 246. Id. at 659. 
 247. Id. at 672. 
 248. Id. at 658. 
 249. Id. at 672 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)).  The majority 
emphasized that content-based prohibitions have “the potential to be a repressive force in the 
lives and thoughts of a free people.”  Id. 
 250. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 666. 
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to be a less restrictive, more effective means of protecting children.251  The 
Court noted the flaws with COPA in comparison to filtering technology: filters 
can block most harmful materials from children, where COPA would only be 
able to enforce its restrictions in the United States; COPA’s age verification 
screens could be circumvented by some minors; COPA could encourage U.S. 
providers to relocate overseas; and filters can apply to all Internet materials, 
including e-mail, rather than merely protecting children from harmful materials 
found on Web-sites.252  Most importantly, filtering technology would not 
burden adult speech.253 
The Court further considered the findings of the Commission on Child 
Online Protection, which Congress itself created.254  The Commission, too, had 
found filtering technology more effective than age-verification 
requirements.255  Although filtering technology has flaws, such as allowing 
some explicit material to reach the user and blocking out material that has 
educational value, the Court found that the government failed its burden to 
show that such technology was, in fact, less effective than COPA.256  The 
government argued that Congress cannot require Internet users to implement 
filtering technology; however, the Supreme Court disagreed.257  The Court 
stated that it had “held that Congress can give strong incentives to schools and 
libraries to use [filtering technology].”258  Thus, Congress may also give 
incentives for development of filtering technology and incentives for 
consumers to implement filtering technology at home.259  The Court found that 
filtering technology was a not only a less restrictive alternative to COPA, but a 
more effective alternative.260 
Beside the existence of a more effective, less restrictive alternative to 
COPA, the Court found other problems with the Act.  As in Reno, the Court 
expressed a concern that COPA’s penalties could chill protected speech.261  
Even where an Internet site requires the user to verify his majority age, the 
harmful materials on the Web site could still subject the Web publisher to 
 
 251. Id. at 666–68. 
 252. Id. at 668. 
 253. Id.  The Court stated that, using filtering technology, adults could access Internet speech 
without identifying themselves or providing credit card information.  Id.  Moreover, promoting 
filters does not condemn speech.  Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 668.  The Court noted that the COPA Commission’s report 
assigned a “score for ‘Effectiveness’ of 7.4 for server-based filters and 6.5 for client-based filters, 
as compared to 5.9 for independent adult-id verification, and 5.5 for credit card verification.”  Id. 
 256. Id. at 669. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)). 
 259. Id. 
 260. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 667. 
 261. Id. at 671. 
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prosecution.262  Thus, the Web publisher could be subject to prosecution 
despite his compliance with the Act, with only an affirmative defense for 
protection.263  The Court emphasized that “[w]here a prosecution is a likely 
possibility, yet only an affirmative defense is available, speakers may self-
censor rather than risk the perils of trial.  There is a potential for extraordinary 
harm and a serious chill upon protected speech.”264 
Finally, the Court noted that factual questions still linger in the case.  The 
Court stated that because the case had been twice appealed to the Supreme 
Court, the parties had not presented new factual findings for almost five 
years265—an eternity in Internet years.  The Court wrote that it had to let the 
decision stand because the government had not met its burden, but that new 
facts could change this.266  Thus, the Court sent COPA all the way back to the 
drawing board—for a full trial in Philadelphia—leaving COPA’s fate uncertain 
for yet a few more years.267  In conclusion, the Court held out some hope to 
COPA supporters, emphasizing that its decision did “not hold that Congress is 
incapable of enacting any regulation of the Internet designed to prevent minors 
from gaining access to harmful materials.”268 
b. Justice Stevens Concurs in the Opinion 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, concurred in the opinion.269  
Stevens again found COPA unconstitutional based on the statute’s 
“contemporary community standards” criterion, which was used to determine 
whether material is harmful in violation of the Act.270  In Ashcroft’s first visit 
to the Supreme Court, Stevens expressed the same opinion in his dissent, 
stating that “in the context of the Internet, . . . community standards become a 
sword rather than a shield.  If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, 
it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web.”271 
However, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority’s finding that filtering 
and blocking software acted as a less restrictive alternative to COPA.272  In 
 
 262. See id.; 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1) (2000). 
 263. See COPA V, 542 U.S. at 670. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id.  To demonstrate the need for new factual findings, the Court looked to statistics given 
by the Internet Systems Consortium, which state that the number of Interest hosts increased from 
36.7 million hosts as of July 1998 to approximately 233.1 million hosts as of January 2004.  Id. 
(citing Internet Systems Consortium, ISC Internet Domain Survey, Jan. 2004, http://www.isc.og/ 
index.pl?/ops/ds) 
 266. Id. at 672. 
 267. Id. 
 268. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 672. 
 269. Id. at 673. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. (quoting COPA III, 535 U.S. 564, 603 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 272. Id. at 674. 
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particular, he emphasized the harshness of COPA’s penalties, writing that 
“[c]riminal prosecutions are . . . an inappropriate means to regulate the 
universe of materials classified as ‘obscene’ since ‘the line between 
communications which “offend” and those which do not is too blurred to 
identify criminal conduct.’”273  Justice Stevens emphasized that COPA’s 
penalties were “strong medicine” when filtering technology or plain, old-
fashioned adult supervision could both protect children and leave Internet 
speech unburdened.274 
c. Justices Scalia and Breyer Dissent 
In his brief dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority erred in 
subjecting COPA to the strict scrutiny test.275  After examining past Supreme 
Court decisions, Scalia emphasized that commercial entities that “deliberately 
emphasiz[e] the sexually provocative aspects” of their products “engage in 
constitutionally unprotected behavior.”276  Scalia wrote that the entire business 
of selling pornography on the Internet could be banned in a manner consistent 
with the First Amendment.277   
Justice Breyer filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor joined.278  Breyer agreed that the Act should 
be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis, but did not believe that Congress’s 
objectives could be accomplished through other, less restrictive means.279  
Breyer noted the similarities between Miller’s obscenity definition and the 
very material COPA sought to regulate,280 and emphasized that the Act 
primarily covered materials that receive no First Amendment protection.281  
Because speech that would appeal to the prurient interest of minors would 
likely appeal to the prurient interest of adults, COPA does not burden protected 
speech.282  Thus, COPA presents no First Amendment problem.283 
 
 273. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 674–75 (quoting Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 274. Id. at 675. 
 275. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 276. Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 831 (2000) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)). 
 277. Id. 
 278. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 676. 
 279. Id. at 677. 
 280. Id. at 678.  Breyer emphasized that speech that appeals to the prurient interest and speech 
devoid of serious literary artistic, political, or scientific value is the only speech that falls within 
COPA’s prohibitions.  Id. at 679.  These elements match Miller’s definition of legally obscene; 
thus, almost all of the speech COPA regulates would be speech that already receives no First 
Amendment protection.  Id. 
 281. Id. at 679–80. 
 282. Id.  Justice Breyer listed examples of speech that, he thought, would not be subject to 
COPA’s penalties, including discussions on sexually transmitted diseases, birth control and 
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Second, Justice Breyer emphasized that the Act does not censor speech, 
“[r]ather, it requires providers of the ‘harmful to minors’ material to restrict 
minors’ access to it by verifying age.”284  Breyer wrote that the cost of 
implementing an age verification screen is minimal and that many commercial 
Web-sites already require such age verification.285  Breyer also pointed out that 
other burdens that could stop Internet users from visiting harmful Web-sites, 
such as embarrassment, did not automatically deem a regulation 
unconstitutional.286 
Justice Breyer then examined the Court’s finding that the Act failed to 
employ the least restrictive means available to advance the government’s 
interest.  Breyer wrote that blocking and filtering technology existed when 
COPA was created, and that COPA was Congress’s attempt to provide 
protection beyond filtering.287  Thus, the majority, by finding that filtering 
technology was a less restrictive alterative, was simply holding that it was less 
restrictive to do nothing.288  Breyer then emphasized the deficiencies of filters.  
He noted the district court’s finding that filters can both under-block and over-
block Internet material.289  He further noted that filters can be costly, and 
parents maintain the responsibility of installing the technology.290  This 
information, Breyer opined, could lead Congress to the reasonable conclusion 
that blocking and filtering software is not an effective solution.291  Breyer 
concluded that the Act, properly interpreted, “risks imposition of minor 
 
homosexuality, and postings of literary works.  Id. at 680.  He emphasized that such works are 
“not both (1) ‘designed to appeal to . . . the prurient interest’ . . . and (2) lacking in ‘serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.’”  Id. at 681.  Thus, such material would remain 
unregulated.  Id. 
 283. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 681–82.  Later in his dissent, Breyer states that “[the Court] could 
construe the statute narrowly—as I have tried to do—removing nearly all protected material from 
its scope.  By doing so, we could reconcile its language with the First Amendment’s demands.”  
Id. at 690–91. 
 284. Id. at 682. 
 285. Id. at 682–83. 
 286. Id.  Breyer quoted the Court’s plurality opinion in United States v. American Library 
Ass’n, Inc., stating that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a 
public library without any risk of embarrassment.”  Id. at 683 (quoting United States v. Am. 
Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 209 (2003)). 
 287. Id. at 683–87. 
 288. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 683–84. 
 289. Id. at 684–86. 
 290. Id. at 685.  Breyer further states: 
More than 28 million school age children have both parents or their sole parent in the 
work force, at least 5 million children are left alone at home without supervision each 
week, and many of those children will spend afternoons and evenings with friends who 
may well have access to computers and more lenient parents. 
Id. 
 291. Id. at 686. 
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burdens on some protected material—burdens that adults wishing to view the 
material may overcome at modest cost,”292 while achieving Congress’s goal of 
protecting children.293  In Breyer’s view, the Act was constitutional.294 
Finally, Justice Breyer reacted to the Court’s remand of the case for further 
findings.  Breyer pointed out that neither side had asked to present further 
evidence, and that it was anybody’s guess what either party could add to the 
matter.295  Furthermore, he wrote that there was nothing more Congress could 
do to regulate the Internet, given the Court’s decision in this case. 296  He 
criticized the majority, stating that if the Court was taking the position that the 
Internet cannot be legislated, or that criminal penalties cannot be employed to 
regulate the Internet, then it should state so clearly rather than sending the case 
back to the district court.297 
VI.  ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO MEET CONGRESS’S GOAL 
Congress and many Americans believe there is an urgent need to protect 
children from Internet pornography, and for good reason.298  The business of 
Internet pornography has flourished in the past few years, and today it accounts 
for two-thirds of all Internet-generated revenue.299  The growth of this now 
$2.5 billion dollar industry has sparked Rep. Michael Oxley, COPA’s co-
author, and the Bush administration to proclaim that this will not be the end of 
their attempt to defend COPA and to regulate the Internet.300  In fact, as 
recently as July of 2005, both the House and the Senate have entertained new 
bills to protect children from Internet pornography.301 
 
 292. Id. at 689. 
 293. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 689. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 689–90. 
 297. Id. at 689–91. 
 298. Morality in Media, Inc., Americans Still Want Federal Obscenity Laws Enforced Against 
Hardcore Internet Pornography, According to Poll Results, Mar. 18, 2004, 
http://www.moralityinmedia.org/obscenityEnforcement/Wirthlin2004.htm.  According to its 
study, Morality in Media, Inc. reports that some eighty-two percent of adult Americans surveyed 
in March 2004 said that “federal laws against Internet obscenity should be vigorously enforced.”  
Id. 
 299. Declan McCullagh, Supreme Court Keeps Net Porn Law on Ice, http://ecoustics-
cnet.com.com/Supreme+Court+keeps+Net+porn+law+on+ice/2100-1028_3-5251475.html (last 
updated June 29, 2004). 
 300. Id.  Rep. Michael Oxley promised that “[t]he fight for COPA and our children is not 
over.  I will contact the Department of Justice and ask it to mount an aggressive case to show the 
court that there is technology to make COPA work . . . .”  Oxley Reacts to Supreme Court Ruling 
on COPA, June 29, 2004, http://oxley.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=378. 
 301. See S. 1507, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3479, 109th Cong. (2005).  These identical bills 
refer to the new proposed legislation as the “Internet Safety and Child Protection Act of 2005.”  
S. 1507 § 1; H.R. 3479 § 1.  The proposed Act’s most notable changes are its regulation of 
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The Court, too, is interested in protecting children from the Internet 
pornography boom.  In Reno, the Court made several suggestions as to how 
Congress could create constitutional legislation.302  In COPA V the majority 
assured COPA supporters that it did “not hold that Congress is incapable of 
enacting any regulation of the Internet designed to prevent minors from 
gaining access to harmful materials.”303  However, despite public outcry and 
the Court’s mixed messages, drafting constitutionally sound legislation has 
proved exceedingly difficult.  Below, Part A will analyze a proposed COPA-
like regulation based on the Court’s decisions in Reno and Ashcroft, and 
determine whether it could pass judicial scrutiny.  Part B will consider non-
legislative measures that have already been employed to protect children, as 
well as other means that may enable Congress to reach its goal. 
A. Creating a New Regulation 
1. Creating a Constitutional COPA 
The Internet has been referred to as a forum that allows the voice to 
resonate “farther than it could from any soapbox”304 and that allows “a true 
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, 
and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”305  These unique qualities 
necessitate heightened First Amendment protection for speech in this medium.  
To their demise, both the CDA and COPA impinged on Internet speech by 
regulating not only obscene material, but also material that is protected as to 
adults, and other valuable speech.  A look at the plaintiffs in both Reno and 
Ashcroft demonstrates the great burdens these statutes imposed.  Founders of 
Web-sites devoted to teaching doctors, promoting AIDS awareness, and 
speaking out against rape were among those that objected to COPA’s 
enactment.306  As the courts have emphasized, for Internet regulations to pass 
constitutional muster, these speakers must remain untouched.307 
 
“pornographic materials” and the change in the definition of “minor” from age seventeen to age 
eighteen.  S. 1507 § 101; H.R. 3479 § 101.  Additionally, the Act places a burden on banks, credit 
card companies, and anyone else that performs financial transactions related to Internet 
pornography to ensure that only age-verified transactions are processed.  S. 1507 § 102; H.R. 
3479 § 102.  The proposed Act requires “regulated pornographic Web site[s]” to use age-
screening software and imposes a twenty-five percent tax on the amount the Internet provider 
charges to those that view its pornographic materials. S. 1507 § 201; H.R. 3479 § 201. 
 302. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876–78 (1997). 
 303. COPA V, 542 U.S. 656, 672 (2004). 
 304. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. 
 305. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 563, 566 (2002) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (Supp. V 
1994)). 
 306. Id. at 571 n.4. 
 307. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. 
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Congress acted quickly when it formulated the CDA, and later COPA.  In 
its haste, Congress put restrictions on Internet speech that were more 
“sweeping” 308 than it had ever intended.309  In actuality, Congress’s goal in 
creating both Acts was merely to eliminate “teaser ads” from the Internet—free 
pornographic images offered by some commercial pornography sites to induce 
Internet users to enter the next screen and then pay to enter the site.310  What 
Congress drafted, however, were statutes with “unprecedented”311 scope, too 
broad to survive First Amendment scrutiny. 
COPA V and Reno teach an important lesson: for Congress to draft 
constitutional legislation, it must not burden protected Internet speech.  
Congress must carefully define the terms and phrases of its regulation and 
avoid imposing heavy sanctions that could chill free speech.  Additionally, 
Internet speakers should have more than an affirmative defense for protection. 
Thus, very narrow legislation that targets only obscene teaser ads that 
appear before a credit card screen could pass judicial scrutiny.  Such legislation 
would greatly narrow COPA’s scope and repair its many flaws.  The 
legislation would not require Web publishers to implement expensive age 
verification screens.  Adults that utilize these sites would not bear the burden 
of disclosing additional personal information, and Web-sites would not lose 
business—only sites that already require credit cards would be affected.312  
Further, only sites that are “commercial” in the sense Congress intended—sites 
that profit from the obscene material itself—would be subject to penalty.  The 
result of this statutory language would be simply that obscene Web-sites with 
teaser ads would be required to remove or alter their ads. 
 
 308. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 309. “In response to public outcry that the Internet was becoming a dangerous place for our 
country’s youth, Congress ignored constitutional precedent and created the most politically 
expedient solution in each legislative attempt.”  Robert K. Magovern, The Expert Agency and the 
Public Interest: Why the Department of Justice Should Leave Online Obscenity to the FCC, 11 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 327, 340 (2003). 
 310. Cohen, supra note 236.  The district court noted in its decision that the measure would 
curb not only teaser ads, but a wide range of more useful speech.  See COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 
497.  In oral arguments before the Supreme Court, petitioner’s counsel stated: 
[m]aterial which is obscene is usually kept behind [an age verification screen] . . .the [age 
verification screen] that the statue requires is already in existence with respect to 
commercial pornography sites. . . . [W]hat the purveyors of [commercial pornography] do 
is put in front of the screen provocative material that we submit would meet the definition 
of harmful to children and make that available to everybody to entice people to go the 
next step to use their credit card or their age identification mechanism . . . . 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, COPA I, 542 U.S. 656 (No. 03-218). 
 311. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997). 
 312. The Third Circuit feared that adults would be unwilling to provide personal information, 
such as a credit card number, especially if the material they wish to access is sensitive or 
controversial.  COPA IV, 322 F.3d 240, 259 (3d. Cir. 2003). 
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Moreover, this proposed regulation could evade the Court’s strict scrutiny 
analysis.  Because the regulation would target only sites with obscene teaser 
ads and credit card verification screens, it would not affect protected speech.  
Safe-sex Web-sites, rape counseling sites and medical and educational sites 
would be well outside the proposed regulation’s scope.  When a regulation 
affects only unprotected speech, as this regulation would, it is not subject to 
strict scrutiny.  Rather, Congress can freely regulate, criminalize, or 
completely ban the speech despite the First Amendment.313  As such, the 
regulation would not have to represent the least restrictive means available.  
Despite the existence of filtering technology, this narrow statute could survive 
judicial scrutiny. 
In COPA V, Justice Kennedy emphasized the potential for a statute that 
utilizes harsh criminal penalties, with only an affirmative defense for 
protection, to chill protected speech.314  The proposed regulation could largely 
eliminate this problem.  Only Web-sites that are both obscene and require a 
credit card before allowing entry would be subject to the regulation.  Very little 
protected speech could fall into this narrow category.  Thus, speakers engaging 
in protected speech would be less likely to fear that the regulation could affect 
them, and, in turn, less likely to self-censor.  Further, the district court in 
COPA I suggested that a possible remedy to COPA’s chilling effect could be to 
incorporate the elements of its affirmative defense into the crime itself.315  By 
imposing restrictions only on those who have verification screens, this 
proposed regulation would do just that. 
The harsh penalties that the CDA and COPA imposed, including thousands 
of dollars in fines and up to two years imprisonment, also led to their 
downfall.316  In American Library Ass’n, part of the Court’s justification for 
upholding legislation that encouraged libraries and schools to install filters was 
that the statute merely withheld funds instead of imposing harsh penalties.317  
To ensure that a new regulation is acceptable, Congress would be well-advised 
to impose a lesser penalty on speakers.  An act with the CDA’s or COPA’s 
daunting sanctions could chill the speech of even those outside the statute’s 
scope. 
B. Non-legislative Measures 
The hypothetical regulation proposed in Section A could possibly pass 
judicial scrutiny and would affect Congress’s goal of eliminating obscene 
teaser ads.  But would the passage of such a statute really protect our children?  
 
 313. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 314. COPA V, 542 U.S. 656, 670–71 (2004). 
 315. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497. 
 316. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(d), 231(a) (2000). 
 317. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003). 
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The district court in COPA I found that over forty percent of all pornographic 
Web-sites originate in foreign countries.318  The Supreme Court emphasized 
that regulations on Internet speech in the United States could send Web 
publishers overseas, where they could avoid penalty altogether.319  Further, 
narrowing regulations to cover only teaser ads would still leave recreational 
Web-sites and harmful emails and chatrooms wide open to minors.  Thus, a 
statute narrow enough to pass Court scrutiny does not protect children.  Indeed, 
even the broadest statute cannot cover a great deal of this harmful Internet 
material.  This Section discusses some more effective solutions as well as some 
of the alternatives Congress has already put into place to protect children. 
1. Blocking and Filtering Technology 
As the courts have emphasized, blocking and filtering technology may be 
the best alternative to protect children from Internet pornography.  This 
technology can block explicit images in the United States and abroad, whether 
on the Web, in emails, or in chatrooms.  In Playboy, the Court considered 
legislation that would protect children from unscrambled cable signals by 
forcing cable providers to eliminate or reschedule indecent programming.320  
Because households have the option to block the transmission of unwanted 
channels, Congress’s legislation was not the least restrictive means 
available.321  Filtering technology is analogous to a blocked cable transmission.  
Those who wish to protect their children can, leaving others to browse the 
Internet and speak freely. 
The effectiveness of a filter will depend, in part, on the type of filter 
utilized.  Today, there are four filter options: client-side filters, content-limited 
Internet providers, server-side filters, and search engine filters.322  Client-side 
filters allow an adult to configure the filter and choose the materials he or she 
wishes to block.323  Under a content-limited system, the Internet provider will 
supply access to a portion of the Internet, while blocking the remainder.324  All 
of the Internet provider’s customers receive the same limited service.  Server-
side filters are best for schools or libraries, where all users must conform to the 
same policy regarding Internet use.325  Finally, there are search engine filters, 
which will block out inappropriate materials that are returned in an Internet 
 
 318. COPA I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
 319. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 667. 
 320. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 806–07 (2000). 
 321. Id. at 825–27. 
 322. Emily R. Novak, Comment, Lost in Cyberspace: An Analysis of How the Supreme Court 
May Help Children Find Their Way Safely on the Internet, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &  
POL’Y 325, 355–56 (2004). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
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search, but will not block a site when the exact address is typed into the 
address bar.326 
Blocking and filtering technology appears more effective than the CDA or 
COPA, but as the courts have pointed out, it has its problems.  A reporter for 
Time recently wrote of her experience with filtering devices, stating that some 
devices “either fail to block pornographic websites altogether or block so many 
sites that your browser becomes unusable.”327  Thus, parents may want to 
consider another alternative: protective monitoring.  A protective monitor 
allows an adult to see the Web-sites that his or her child has previously 
accessed.328  Unlike filtering, this alternative cannot prevent a minor from 
reaching inappropriate Web-sites; but knowing that an adult can retrace their 
steps may deter children from intentionally seeking out pornographic 
materials.329 
No one device provides the perfect solution for safe Internet use for 
children.  The answer, however, may not be to implement one single line of 
defense against unwanted materials.  According to the National Research 
Council, a blend of technical and educational steps could be the ideal way to 
protect children.330  Thus, a filter, together with an educated child and parental 
supervision may be the best bet.  Parents must educate themselves and 
understand that filters and monitors should supplement adult supervision, not 
replace it. 
2. Congressional Measures 
Although it will be difficult for Congress to create COPA-like legislation 
that is both constitutional and effective, Congress may be able to use other 
means to reach its goal of protecting children.  Already, it has created the Dot 
Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002.331  The Act mandated the 
creation of an entire domain, “dot kids,” that contains only material that is 
appropriate for children under thirteen.332  George Bush signed the Act into 
 
 326. Id. at 356. 
 327. Anita Hamilton, The Web Porn Patrol, TIME, July 12, 2004, at 87.  The author noted that 
when using one filtering device she was unable to log onto a Nickelodeon Web-site, a Web-site 
designed especially for children.  Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. “No single approach can provide a solution, since any one approach alone can be 
circumvented with enough effort.  A balanced mix of strategies is needed.”  David Lazarus, Net 
Porn Filters Just Don’t Work, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/ 
2002/11/13/BU158763.DTL (last visited February 1, 2005) (quoting former Attorney General 
Richard Thornburgh, chairman of the committee that prepared the NRC’s study). 
 331. See Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-317, 116 Stat. 
2766 (2002).  The “dot kids” domain can be found at http://www.kids.us. 
 332. Id. at § 2; see MARCIA S. SMITH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INTERNET: 
STATUS REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT CHILDREN FROM UNSUITABLE 
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effect in December of 2002, stating: “[W]e must give our nation’s children 
every opportunity to grow in knowledge without undermining their 
character . . . we must give parents the peace of mind knowing their children 
are learning safely.”333  Committee reports liken this domain to the children’s 
section of a library: it is entirely appropriate for children, without burdening 
adult speech in any way.334  Today, more than 1,700 dot kids domain names 
have been sold.335 
Congress has also made it easier for children to browse the Internet 
without accidentally accessing pornographic materials.  Under the “Truth in 
Domain Names” provision of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to 
End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003,336 it is a crime to use a 
misleading domain name to deceive a person into viewing Internet obscenity or 
to deceive minors into viewing material harmful to them.337  Prior to the Act, 
typing “whitehouse.com” rather than “whitehouse.gov” into a Web-browser 
would take the Internet user to a hard-core pornography site.338  Today, the Act 
prohibits this and imposes criminal penalties on those who use such misleading 
Web addresses. 
In the future, Congress may also be able to utilize its spending power to 
protect children from harmful Internet materials.  In American Library Ass’n, 
the Court upheld a statue that allowed the government to withhold funds from 
public schools and libraries that fail to implement filtering technology.339  The 
Court stated that Congress had provided the funds so that libraries and schools 
could provide Internet access, thus, Congress could condition receipt of the 
funds on whether they are used in the manner anticipated and authorized.340  In 
COPA V, the Court suggested that Congress further utilize this power to 
provide “strong incentives” for the development of filtering technology and its 
implementation home.341 
Congress’s taxing power could also be utilized to help protect children.  
Tax incentives could encourage individuals to implement filtering technology 
and set off the cost of doing so.  In fact, the latest bills entertained by both the 
House and Senate have done just that.342  Among other things, the bills require 
 
MATERIAL ON THE WEB 5 (May 26, 2004), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/ 
data/2004/upl-meta-crs-5804/RS21328_2004May26.pdf. 
 333. Novak, supra note 322, at 358–59. 
 334. Id. 
 335. SMITH, supra note 332, at 5. 
 336. Pub .L. No. 108-21 § 521, 117 Stat. 650, 686. 
 337. Id. 
 338. LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 101, at 188–89. 
 339. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003). 
 340. Id. at 212. 
 341. See COPA V, 542 U.S. 656, 669 (2004). 
 342. See S. 1507, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3479, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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Web providers that sell Internet pornography to pay a twenty-five percent tax 
on the amounts charged to customers.343 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As Justice Breyer’s dissent in COPA V emphasized, “No one denies 
that . . . an interest [in protecting children] is compelling.”344  However, courts 
have also expressed that no matter how compelling the interest, free expression 
on the Internet is worthy of protection, too.  Ultimately, it seems unlikely that 
COPA will pass judicial scrutiny despite the Supreme Court’s recent refusal to 
hold it unconstitutional.  It is difficult to conceive of technological advances or 
other evidence that the government could produce on remand to cure COPA’s 
many pitfalls.  The courts have sent a message: This ineffective statute is not 
worth the burden on speech that it would impose. 
As outlined above, the Court has not precluded Congress from protecting 
children from Internet obscenity.  Thus far, Congress has encouraged the use 
of filters in public libraries and schools, created a safe domain especially for 
children, and enacted legislation to make it less likely that a child will 
inadvertently stumble upon pornographic material.  In the future, Congress 
may be able to utilize its spending and taxing powers to further encourage the 
development and use of filtering technology.  The Court’s holding in COPA V 
does not leave children unprotected.  It merely requires Congress to protect 
children in a way that does not infringe on our new, but fundamental right to 




 343. Id. 
 344. COPA V, 542 U.S. at 683. 
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